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I INTRODUCTION
it is almost seventy years since Justice Holmes in a famous dissent
discussed freedom of speech in terms of a market in ideas,' but the
invitation thus tendered to analyze free speech from the standpoint
of economics has yet to be accepted. The economics of free speech
have not been totally ignored. Ronald Coase and Aaron Director have
written interesting essays discussing the parallels between the market
in goods and the market in ideas.2 There is also here and there in
the legal literature some implicit economic analysis of free speech3 ;
a literature on the impact of market structure on diversity of expres-
sion in the media"; and a critical literature, tangentially economic,
on the "market in ideas" conception of free speech.' Since its first
edition in 1973 my book Economic Analysis of Law has contained
a chapter on the economics of free speech,6 but this is the only at-
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. This article is based on the Eighteenth Donahue Lecture delivered at
Suffolk University Law School on March 6, 1968, and on the Meiklejohn Lecture delivered
at Brown University on March 5, 1986,
i am grateful for the helpful questions and Comments of members of the audiences of
these lectures, to Gary Becker, Frank Easterbrook, Kent Greenawalt, Martin Redish, George
Stigler, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, and William Van Alstyne for comments on a previous
draft; and to Dwight Miller and Nir Yarden for research assistance.
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 US. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[t]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market").
2. See Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PRocEEDNtos 384 (1974), Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES
i, i-5 (1977); Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 i. L. & ECON. I, 3-6
(964); Cf. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Question
and Questionable Answer*, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1985) (discussing Supreme Court's cases
on commercial free speech from an economic standpoint, but not the economics of free speech).
3. See W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT I, 21-49 (1984);
Sehauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L,
REV. 685, 705-32 (1978).
4. See B. OWEN, EcoNoMIcs AND FREEDOM OF EkFRESSION6 MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT i, 33-182 (1973); 1. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM I, 55-225 (1983).
5. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 967-90 (1978); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. I.
6. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW Ch. 28 (3d ed. 1986).
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tempt at an explicit economic approach to the regulation of speech
generally, and its eleven pages merely scratch the surface of this
neglected topic.
The neglect is surprising, in view not only of the rapid development
of "law and economics" (i.e., the application of economics to law)
but also of the emergence of a full-fledged economics of informa-
tion, which might seem directly relevant to issues of free speech. The
neglect has the usual explanation: most economists shy away from the
tangle of rebarbative complexities that is legal doctrine, and most
lawyers specializing in free speech issues are attracted to the field
because of enthusiasm for a version of liberal political thought to
which economic analysis may seem uncongenial.' Another cause may
be the fact that one of the leading theorists of free speech, John Stuart
Mill, was a famous economist but didn't use economics in his analysis
of free speech,8 I hope in this article to begin to remedy the neglect
of a fascinating set of economic issues. My coverage, however, is par-
tial, and my conclusions tentative.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A NUTSHELL
For readers who are not familiar with first amendment law (here
used as a shorthand for the speech and press clauses of the First
Amendment), a thumbnail sketch of the evolution and present state
of that law may be helpful. 9 The first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press. . . ." This language seems clear enough, until
one reflects on two points."° The first is that if you read the clause
with emphasis on the words "Congress" and "abridging," it becomes
a jurisdictional allocation, and a narrow one. Congress is not to pass
laws abridging free speech, but maybe any other branch of government
can do so (notably, perhaps, the courts, using the contempt power,
or by enforcing private rights); and maybe any organ of government,
7. Cf. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHn. L. REv. 988, 989-90 (1984).
Even the most careful scholars of free speech seem (to me at least) uncritically to equate broaden-
ing the scope of protection with progress and enlightenment. See Gunther, Learned Hand and
the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719, 755 (1975).
8. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1859); C. L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY ch. 8 (1980);
Canavan, Mill on Freedom of Expression, 23 MOD. AGE 362 (1979).
9. The legal literature is of course immense. An introduction at once lucid and comprehensive
is provided by the section on freedom of expression, in G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein,
& M. Tushnet's CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Another good introduction is Rabban, The Emergence
of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CH]. L. REv. 1205 passim (1983).
10. See L. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 1, 220-81 (1985).
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including Congress, can regulate speech, provided it does not abridge
it. Second, the term "the freedom of speech, or of the press" could
be an eighteenth-century term of art. Writing shortly before the Ameri-
can Revolution, Blackstone had defined freedom of the press very
narrowly-as meaning just freedom from "prior restraint," by which
he meant censorship." Criminal punishment for speech or writings
critical of the government-not to mention for obscene, blasphemous,
and defamatory speech or writing-was permissible.' 2 The rationale for
the distinction between censorship and criminal punishment was that
the former was administrative, while the latter could be imposed
only after a trial by jury, and Blackstone apparently trusted juries
not to convict unless the defendant was abusing the right of free
expression. It is true that censorship is not the only form of prior
restraint; another is the injunction, which is issued without a trial
by jury but by a judge presumably more independent of the political
branches of the government than a censor would be. If freely allowed
in cases involving speech or press, the injunction might have come
to play the same role in preventing criticism of government that the
labor injunction played in preventing strikes before the Norris-
LaGuardia and Wagner Acts took this weapon away from the courts.'"
The logic of Blackstone's analysis might seem to embrace the in-
junction as well as censorship, but Blackstone himself did not make
this extension."
The constitutional protection of free speech and a free press would
have only limited significance today if it were tied to Blackstone's
concept. It is unlikely, however, that the framers of the first amend-
ment meant to confine it just to prohibiting Congress from establishing
a system of licensing the press.' 5 If they had meant no more, why
even mention freedom of speech? They could simply have guaranteed
freedom of the press. No one was concerned that Congress might
require people to get federal licenses before they would be allowed
to speak.
But assuming therefore that the framers wanted to give some protec-
tion against punishment after the fact for speech or writing, and against
injunctions that prevented speaking or writing, we are left at sea regard-
ing how much protection they wanted to give (does "speech" include
music, art, gestures, solicitation, incitement?), as well as whether they
11. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (1769).
12. See id.
13. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115, 217.
14. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 151.
15. See L. LEVY, supra note II, at 267-74.
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wanted to restrict organs of the federal government besides Congress.
The scholarly literature on these questions is vast, erudite-and in-
conclusive.' 6 In default of scholarly consensus, the best assumption
may be that the framers deliberately chose a rather indefinite and
noncommittal formulation and left to the future the task of giving
it precise content.
If considerations of adherence to precedent are set to one side (a
big "if," I grant), the judiciary has a broad latitude in deciding how
much government regulation of speech and the press to allow. History,
however, provides some legal, and more pragmatic, support for in-
terpreting the first amendment as placing stricter limitations on federal
regulation of the market in ideas than the due process or just com-
pensation clauses of the fifth amendment place on federal regulation
of markets in goods. The language of the free-speech clause, the con-
dition of the press in America when the clause was enacted, the fear
of strong central government that produced the Bill of Rights, the
unhappy experience with the Alien and Sedition Acts, the anti-German
hysteria during World War I and the post-war "Red Scare," the ex-
cesses associated with the name of Joseph McCarthy, and more broadly
the discouraging record of mistake, absurdity, and futility that is the
history of efforts to censor or punish speech and writing, all argue
for the stricter limitation. But how much stricter is unclear.
Until World War I the first amendment was not a significant
source of justiciable rights. Indeed, it was narrowly construed until
the 1940's and, some would say, until the 1960's. An important step
was taken in 1925, however, when the Supreme Court "decided" that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies the prin-
ciples of the first amendment to the states." I use quotation marks
to highlight the curious way in which the decision was made. The
Court said merely that it would assume that the principles of the first
amendment applied to the states; no explanation for that assumption
was given. The pertinent discussion in Justice Holmes' dissent (joined
by Justice Brandeis) is equally terse.'" Later cases repeated the assump-
tion until it became a dogma, but there has never been a satisfactory
judicial discussion of the issue and of course scholars remain divided
over whether and to what extent the fourteenth amendment was in-
tended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states.' 9 The basic judicial
16. See, e.g., Symposium on Historical Perspective on the Free Press, 37 STAN. L. REV.
661 (1985).
17. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
18. See id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Limitations on State Power,
1865-1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 348-55 (1984).
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attitude, well captured in Gitlow, seems to have been that since liberty
of contract had been held to be a right to which the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment gave substantive protection, liberty
of speech and of the press must also be such rights. After liberty
of contract ceased to receive substantive protection this premise fell
away-seemingly without the judges' noticing what had happened.
Holmes and Brandeis had said in Gitlow that the states should
have more scope under the fourteenth amendment in regulating speech
than the federal government had under the first amendment."0 But the
Supreme Court's current view (which I shall question later) is that the
states have no more scope. The Court has also extended the constitu-
tional protection of free speech to cover art, entertainment, defamation
of private persons, commercial advertising, and much else besides,
though the protection given in these areas is generally less extensive
than that given political speech. Although these extensions carry the
first amendment much further than its framers could have imagined,
it may have been their intention, as I have suggested and shall assume
in what follows, to establish a broad standard that courts would par-
ticularize on a case-by-case fashion, in common law fashion, rather
than to set narrow limits based on the framers' own knowledge and
experience.
What I shall not assume, however, is that freedom of speech is
a holy of holies which should be exempt from the normal tradeoffs
that guide the formation of legal policy. I therefore take respectful
exception to this recent statement by Judge Easterbrook:
A belief may be pernicious-the beliefs of Nazis led to the death of
millions, those of the Klan to the repression of millions. A pernicious
belief may prevail. Totalitarian governments today rule much of the
planet, practicing suppression of billions and spreading dogma that
may enslave others. One of the things that separates our society from
theirs is our absolute right to propagate opinions that the government
finds wrong or even hateful."
Valuable as the right of free speech is, I for one would be willing
to trade off a modest curtailment of it in exchange for saving millions
of lives. And modest it would be. The ideas that the Nazis and the
Ku Klux Klan propagate are as worthless as they are vicious, and
while Communist dogma cannot be dismissed so readily, the political
successes of Communism have been due largely to force rather than
20. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd without opinion, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
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persuasion. The mechanism by which worthless and vicious ideas
might nevertheless prevail is not specified in the quoted passage,
which conceives the spread of dogma as a kind of epidemic. But
if so, why must it be absolutely free from interference by government?
The fact that the propagators of vicious ideas are given to violence
as well as speech, that their speech consists largely of persuading
their audience of the delights of despoiling some other group, and
that the framers of the first amendment, who were practical men
rather than ideologues, would not have wanted to tie the hands of
government in dealing with movements so alien to their own ex-
perience and so ominous, goes unmentioned. Indeed, the suggestion
that the first amendment ties our hands in dealing with Nazi and
communist revolutionaries, even though totalitarianism was not fore-
seen in 1789, is an unintended intimation of that most frightening
of constitutional conceptions: the Constitution as a suicide pact.
Judge Easterbrook is only the most recent in a distinguished line of
judicial rhapsodists of free speech. Magnificent as Justice Holmes'
dissent in Abrams v. United States is, he goes too far when he states
that free speech can be restrained only when "an immediate check
is required to save the country.12 2 As Holmes well knew, the state
must be allowed to restrain speech if necessary in order to avert
lesser catastrophes as well. I cannot even understand what Holmes
meant when he said in his dissent in Gitlow that "[i]f in the long
run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to
be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way." ' 23 If those beliefs are destined to prevail, free
speech is irrelevant. Holmes is not describing a competitive market
in ideas but a natural monopoly.
In United States v. Dennis, Learned Hand stated that the Com-
munist Party had an absolute constitutional right to advocate a
political program that included using violence to suppress all op-
position after the Party takes power by lawful means and amends
the Constitution to eliminate freedom. 4 He did not find it necessary
to examine the paradox of making the first amendment the agency
for destroying the first amendment. Even brilliant conservative judges
seem to suspend some of their critical faculties in the presence of
claims to freedom of speech. Perhaps the time has come to give the
free-speech icon an acid bath of economics.
22. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
24. 183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF REGULATING FREE SPEECH
A. An Expanded Dennis Formula
As a vehicle for organizing analysis and bringing out such special
features as the marketplace of ideas may have, I propose to build
on the free-speech formula that Hand used in Dennis.25 The formula,
a counterpart to Hand's negligence formula,16 requires a court called
on to determine the constitutionality of a regulation that limits free-
dom of speech to "ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' [i.e., if
the instigation sought to be prevented or punished succeeds], dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger." '2 7 In symbols, regulate if but.
only if B < PL, where B is the cost of the regulation (including
any loss from suppression of valuable information), P is the probability
that the speech sought to be suppressed will do harm, and L is the
magnitude (social cost) of the harm.
I shall expand the formula in a way that will facilitate discussion
of its various components. I decompose B into its two principal
components-V (for "value"), the social loss from suppressing val-
uable information, and E (for "error"), the legal-error costs incurred
in trying to distinguish the information that society desires to suppress
from valuable information. V is a function of the size of the actual
and potential audience for the speech in question (the concept of poten-
tial audience is discussed later) and of the decrease in audience brought
about by the challenged regulation. My other modification of Hand's
formula is to discount L to present value, to reflect the fact that the
harm from allowing dangerous speech to continue may not be incur-
red for some years. With these adjustments, the Dennis formula be-
comes V + E < P x L/(1 + i)n, where n is the number of periods
between the utterance of the speech and the resulting harm and i
is an interest or discount rate which translates a future dollar of
social cost into a present dollar. The larger i and n are, the smaller
will be the harm from the speech. Although a riot produces much less
harm than a violent revolution, a speech that urges an immediate riot
may, after the anticipated harm from violent revolution is discounted
to present value, have an expected harm nearly as great as that of
25. See id. at 212.
26. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); R. POSNER,
TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ch. 1 (1982).
27. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951). (Hand meant "probability," not "improbability.").
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a speech advocating revolution in the distant future, even if the prob-
ability of the two events is identical.28
B. The Costs of Suppression
1. Costs in Valuable Information Suppressed or Deterred
I shall take up the components of the expanded Dennis formula
in order, beginning with V, the information loss from suppressing
speech. V depends on (1) the nature and value of the speech suppressed
and (2), the amount of speech suppressed, which in turn depends
on (a), the method, scope, and extent of regulation, and (b), the
market robustness (versus fragility) of the speech suppressed-more
precisely, the degree to which the social benefits of the speech are
externalized.
a. A Hierarchy of Value?
To try to measure the value of particular speeches (or writings)
would often-though, not always, as we shall see-involve intractable,
subjective, and arbitrary inquiries, implying that E (error costs) would
be very high. Categorical comparisons may seem a feasible alternative,
but I wonder. Almost everyone's candidate for the highest rank in a
hierarchy of value is political speech, because of the historically and
logically close connection between free elections and other institutions
of democratic government, on the one hand, and freedom of speech
and the press on the other. 9 The most dangerous of monopolies is a
monopoly of political power.3 Political competition is impeded if the
government is allowed to prevent the expression of opposition views.
Without free speech, moreover, a government will have difficulty try-
ing to discover what the people are thinking; and ignorance of popular
opinion can result in disastrous miscalculations, as Louis XVI, Nicholas
II, and the Shah of Iran, among many others, discovered to their
immense sorrow. It might seem, though, that if free speech were in the
government's own interest, the government would protect it voluntarily,
just as a business firm might voluntarily set up a complaint box for
its employees to use. But government leaders may have a much shorter
time horizon than society as a whole. Their utility may be maximized
by trying to keep the lid on, even if they are aware that the long-
term prospects for social stability will be undermined.
28. 1 come back to the question of discounting in Part II(C)(2). Notice that if the harm
is immediate, so that n = 0, then L/(l + i) n = L, while if the discount rate is zero, again L/
(I + i)n = L.
29. See Converse, Power and the Monopoly of Information, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. I (1985).
30. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, § 24.2.
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There are serious problems, however, with placing political speech
(or any other category of speech, for that matter) at the top of a
hierarchy of speech values. First, there is no clear demarcation be-
tween political speech and other speech, once the purpose of protecting
political speech is understood to be the preservation of political
competition. Suppose an Administration that drew its major political
support from fundamentalist Christians forbade the teaching of ev-
olution or the public advocacy of a right of abortion. The ideas sup-
pressed would not be political unless "political" is defined to mean
everything that is important to people; but suppressing such ideas might
make it more difficult to unseat the Administration in the next election.
Another problem, which plagues all lexical orderings, is that even
if eliminating freedom of political speech entirely would be more
harmful than eliminating all art, all advertising, or even all scientific
debate, a limited abridgment of political speech may be less harmful
than a more sweeping abridgment of nonpolitical speech. Forbidding
all Nazi advocacy would do less harm to society than suppressing
all scientific discussion or, for that matter, all price advertising. It
would be foolish, therefore, to treat all abridgments of political speech
as having a higher V than all abridgments of nonpolitical speech.
Finally, there is the issue raised by Coase and Director-whether
in fact, and abstracting from the self-interest of those of us who
participate directly or indirectly in the market for political speech,
political freedom can be shown to be more important than economic
freedom. If not-if political monopolies really aren't worse in general
than government-imposed economic monopolies, restrictions, and ex-
clusions-then it is unclear why political speech should be thought
more valuable than "economic" speech, broadly defined to include
all speech that enhances individual welfare and therefore embracing
artistic expression (including even the most vulgar entertainment) and
scientific inquiry. Maybe economic freedom can be shown to depend
on political freedom, but that is too large an issue to venture on in
this article.
Two further observations on political speech:
(1) The social costs from suppressing political speech are greater
at the federal than at the state level, and at the state than at the local
level. The lower one descends in the scale, the more competitive checks
on the abuse of political power there are.3' Persons "tyrannized" by
city government can move to another city; with greater difficulty, to
31. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, § 24.2.
[Vol. XX: I
HeinOnline  -- 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 10 1986
FREE SPEECH AND ECONOMICS
another state; but (for most people) only with very great difficulty
to another country. I shall come back to this point.
(2) The economic argument for freedom of political speech is
not, as one might have expected, that truth can be determined only
by a competition among ideas. The most important aspect of free-
dom of political speech is simply the right to criticize government
officials and policies-that is, the right to disseminate information
that may affect how people vote in the next election. The suppression
of relevant information in the political market, as in the market for
(ordinary) goods and services, may distort choice and in that way
reduce welfare even if there is no competition in ideas because com-
peting political parties subscribe to the same ideas.
Another broad category of speech and writing is the domain of
ideas and entertainment generally-the whole of information in a
broad sense-outside of political ideas and comment. The principal
subclasses of this category are scientific and other technical and
scholarly information and opinions; art and entertainment, whether
literary, aural, or pictorial and whether high-brow or low-brow; and
commercial advertising, labeling, and public relations. For reasons
already sufficiently indicated, I am skeptical whether this domain can
be placed below political speech by reference to differences in value.
I am even somewhat dubious about the feasibility of carving out
obscenity as a category of zero or minimal social value. The fact that
its appeal is emotional rather than rational and that much of it is
tawdry and repulsive does not distinguish it sharply from many other
forms of speech, including a great deal of political speech that is fully
protected constitutionally and low-grade but not obscene entertain-
ment. It would seem therefore, at least in an economic analysis, that
the case for regulating obscenity would require consideration of the
harms of obscenity (the right-hand side of the Dennis formula) rather
than just the lack of benefits.
There is a third category of speech, which has two divisions.
The first is speech (or writing) where the only purpose is to express
the speaker's intentions-as in the case of a ransom note, or a robber's
announcing a hold-up. The second is speech (or writing) which pro-
vides information solely as an input into an activity that has been
made illegal for reasons unrelated to any desire to regulate the market-
place for ideas-as in the case of solicitation to commit murder.
Analytically, this category is not limited to criminal solicitations; it
is just that innocent solicitations do not invite regulation, because they
do no harm (remember that I am discussing here only the costs
and not the benefits of regulating speech). If I tell you, for ex-
19861
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ample, that tomorrow I'm going for a walk, the information thereby
conveyed has only a limited value, though not, as in the case of
a criminal solicitation, a negative value. It is merely that if the direct
and indirect uses of a given piece of information are very limited-
if, in other words, the actual and potential audience is very small-
the information will have only limited value. In my example of say-
ing I'm going for a walk, not only is the actual audience minute,
but so is the potential audience. A scientific or mathematical prop-
osition, on the other hand, while it may be so arcane that its actual
audience is very small, may have a vast potential audience, compris-
ing all the people who will eventually receive the information (greatly
simplified, or perhaps impounded in some good or service).
Speech in my third category has little social value, because of its
highly restricted audience (actual and potential). With V (information
loss from suppression) thus close to zero, the only thing to consider
on the cost side of suppression is the cost of legal error (i.e., of mistak-
ing valuable speech for valueless speech). Concern with this cost ex-
plains recent cases invalidating statutes that punish "threats" defined
so broadly as to include invitations to engage in activity not itself
illegal, such as certain boycotts.3" A difficult intermediate case, illus-
trated by Dennis itself (a prosecution of Communist leaders for con-
spiracy to advocate the violent overthrow of the government), is the
threat premised on potentially significant political (or social, or eco-
nomic) ideas." Maybe the threat should be punishable, since the prem-
ises are severable. The practical problem is that they may imply the
threat, making it unnecessary to utter it, and the implied threat can
be punished only by punishing the expression of the premises.
b. The Nature and Scope of Regulation
The amount of suppression, and hence the loss of valuable informa-
tion depends first on the nature of the regulation and second on the
economic characteristics of the regulated market.
32. See State v. Robertson, 293 Ore. 402, 427-31, 649 P.2d 569, 585-87 (1982); Greenawalt,
Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1081 (1983). More narrowly
drawn statutes forbidding threats have been sustained against constitutional challenge. United
States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1356-58 (7th Cir. 1985).
33. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 203-05 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
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(1) Censorship.
Under the first heading, an initial distinction should be made be-
tween ex ante and ex post suppression: that is, between censorship
(or injunctions, but I shall focus on censorship) and criminal punish-
ment. The conventional arguments3 ' for why censorship is worse than
criminal punishment are little better than plausible (though I think
there is at least one good argument). For example, the argument that
censors will have a conflict of interest in dealing with speech criticial
of the government that employs them applies only to a subset
of political speech and, more important, ignores the possibility of giving
censors the same independence enjoyed by other adjudicative officers.
The power that independence from political accountability would confer
on a single censor could be cut down by having many censors.
Scholarly hostility to censorship is so great that no one tries to ex-
plore ways of improving the machinery of censorship.
It is said that the censor's decisions will be allotted too much weight
by reviewing courts, because he is an expert; but as an expert he might
avoid some of the vicious, bigoted, hysterical, or Philistine judgments
that a jury might make. It is said that since the business of a censor
is censorship he will have to censor something in order to justify
his job. But many government officials seem happy to do very little,
and there are others (the members of the Strategic Air Command,
for example) whose principal job is to stand by for emergencies that
everyone hopes will never occur.
It is said that censorship suppresses more expression than criminal
punishment does, because it prevents expression rather than merely
punishes it. But this argument depends on an assumption that the
criminal penalties are too light to deter, without explaining why that
is a good assumption. Although criminal defendants do have more
procedural safeguards than parties to administrative proceedings, they
have them precisely because of the greater severity of criminal than
of administrative penalties. Most people do not lightly commit crimes
in the hope of escaping through one of the loopholes in the criminal
justice system, numerous as those loopholes are. Indeed, speech
might be freer if passing the censor conferred immunity from criminal
34. Well summarized in Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 648, 656-60 (1955). For criticism at some points parallel to my own, see M. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF ExPREssioN: A C~mrcAL ANALYSIS ch. 3 (1984); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PIm.osoPHcAL INQUIRY 151-52 (1982).
HeinOnline  -- 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 13 1986
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
prosecution than it is under a system where there is no way of ob-
taining authoritative guidance to whether a proposed speech or writing
will create criminal liability.
Finally, it is said that the censor will exaggerate the harm from
free speech when the harm is merely predicted; if it were allowed
to come to pass, everyone would realize that the harm was slight.
But why is the censor not as likely to underestimate as to overestimate
a future harm? The answer has to be that it is the censor's business
to suppress, and I have explained why I find that an unpersuasive
point.
The question whether censorship is more likely to endanger free
speech than criminal punishment answered on empirical grounds.
Eighteenth-century censors were more likely to suppress free speech
than juries were to convict people of violating the laws against seditious
libel, but no one knows whether this would be true today. As a matter
of fact, there is still much censorship in this country. Public schools,
public libraries, and individual teachers in public schools and in public
colleges and universities engage in forms of censorship, as does the
Federal Communications Commission in licensing radio and televi-
sion stations. Prisoners' mail is lawfully censored." There is, of course,
much private censorship, including self-censorship. Every editor is a
censor, and not always a private one, since many scholarly journals
are published by public universities. There is censorship of military
secrets, juvenile court records, informants' identities, and much else
besides. In the limit, any compromise with full disclosure could be
described as censorship, and whether in practice censorship (broadly
or narrowly defined) is more, and more unreasonably, restrictive than
criminal punishment is hard to say.
Experience in the regulation of goods and services, however, sug-
gests that, at the very least, censorship could cause serious delay
in the communication of ideas and opinions, compared to punishment
after the fact. The licensing of nuclear reactors and of other power
sources, and of new drugs, illustrates the danger. Here at last we
approach the heart of the case against censorship; but it is not delay.
Every major source of electric power and every major new drug has
potentially substantial adverse impacts, which have been thought
(rightly or wrongly) to warrant a patient examination of the desir-
ability of the new power source or new drug before it can be supplied.
But the fraction of books, magazines, newspapers, or speeches that
35. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974).
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have potentially substantial adverse impacts is minute. To sift through
all this stuff looking for the counterpart to Three Mile Island or
Thalidomide would not be cost effective. Censorship makes sense
only when the censoring authorities want to exercise very tight control
over public expression, and usually that degree of control will violate
the Dennis formula.
In the areas where censorship is practiced in this country today,
a relatively high proportion of the materials reviewed are objectionable
to the censors; the number of books not suitable for an elementary
school library really is very large. But a general censorship of books,
magazines, newspapers, and speeches could not be justified on this
ground. Nor does the argument just sketched make a case for cen-
sorship, as distinct from rebutting an argument against it. For that
we must turn to the economic model of optimal ex ante regulation.36
Unfortunately the model focuses on the tradeoffs between regulation
(ex ante) and common law damages (ex post). Because the harms from
speech typically are diffuse and the causality is complex, the choice
on the ex post side is usually criminal punishment rather than tort
damages, though defamation is an important exception. Part of the
model is usable here, nevertheless. Ex ante regulation makes economic
sense when the potential harm is so enormous that the injurer will not
be able to pay full damages if the harm occurs and the injurer is
sued. Suppose there is a .0001 probability of a $1 billion nuclear
reactor accident but the net worth of the reactor's owner is only
$100 million. In deciding what precautions to take, the owners will
compare their cost not with an expected accident cost of $100,000
($1 billion x .0001) but with an expected liability cost of only $10,000
($100 million x .0001), and will therefore take too few precautions
from an economic standpoint. The problem is not avoided by changing
the sanction from tort damages to a criminal fine, just as it would
not be a sufficient sanction for murder to take away all of the
murderer's existing and future wealth: if the probability of being caught
is substantially less than one, the expected sanction may be a modest
one, as in my reactor example. For these and other reasons monetary
sanctions are not severe enough for purposes of criminal law; but
the nonmonetary sanctions are bounded too, and, for a variety of
reasons, at quite low levels for most crimes." Some speech might
36. See Shavell. Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357
(1984).
37. See Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 CoLum. L. Ray. 1193, 1205-14
(1985); Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent,
85 COLUM. L. Rv. 1232, 1235-36 (1985).
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have a very high expected harm-it might, for example be the
dissemination of important military secrets or the formula for a low-
cost atomic bomb-yet not be deterrable by threat of criminal sanction.
In such a case there is an argument for censorship, provided that
violations of censorship can be prevented, and are not merely punished
after the fact. The punishment for such a violation (e.g., for refusing
to submit a dispatch to a military censor) will be bounded by the
same factors that would cause an ordinary criminal sanction to be
bounded. Suppose, however, that the military controls the com-
munications from the front lines, so that it is impossible to avoid
the censor no matter how willing the correspondent is to run the
risk of punishment. Then the boundedness of punishment will not
prevent censorship from being effective, though before censorship
can be justified on this ground the increment in effectiveness must
be compared with the incremental costs. Censorship is administratively
more costly than punishment after the fact because it requires sifting
through potentially massive materials that may contain only a small
fraction of objectionable matter.
Notice that I have stood the conventional case against censorship
on its head. An important part of that case is the proposition that
censorship suppresses speech more effectively than the threat of
criminal punishment does. This does not seem to be true (or necessarily
true) in general, but may be true in some cases where the potential
harm from the speech is very great.
(2) Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions.
As we have seen, the distinction between censorship and criminal
punishment is not so good an example of the distinction between
complete and partial suppression of speech as some students of free
speech (and most judges) believe. A better example is the smaller
scope allowed to government in regulating the "content" of speech
than in regulating its "time, place, and manner." To forbid the
advocacy of supply-side economics completely would be more re-
strictive (higher V) than to forbid the advocacy of supply-side
economics only by noisy demonstrations that disrupt traffic, or by
soundtrucks, or in the lobbies of government buildings. Restrictions
on the time, place, and manner of expressing ideas and opinions
operate as a tax of variable severity on ideas and opinions by making
it more costly for the speaker to reach his audience. They are like
a tax on newsprint or on broadcast air time, or, for that matter, an
increase in second-class postal rates. A prohibition on all public ex-
pression of an idea is a much heavier tax. Stated differently, a decibel
limit on broadcasting from a soundtruck reduces the audience for
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the soundtruck's message, but by much less than an outright ban on
the message; V (the loss in speech value) is therefore less.
My comparison, however, is loaded. I have compared forbidding
the advocacy of a specific policy with restricting the time, place,
and manner of that advocacy. Most time, place, and manner re-
strictions operate across the board, so that a more germane com-
parison is between these blanket restrictions and more drastic
restrictions on advocating particular ideas. It is not obvious in this
comparison where the higher V is found.38 All depends on the par-
ticular restriction. If the government forbade all political speech ex-
cept on Febuary 29, the effects would be more dramatic than if it
merely outlawed the advocacy of genocide or syndicalism. Also, par-
ticular times, places, and manners of speech may be correlated to
some degree with particular messages, so that ostensibly and perhaps
sincerely neutral restrictions may load the scales against particular view-
points. The reason such restrictions are treated more leniently than
viewpoint restrictions may have little to do with effect. Rather, it may
be that the justifications are clearer and don't require the courts to
make judgments likely to result in the suppression of particular
viewponts-with consequences about to be discussed. In other words,
E may be lower. This is clearest in the soundtruck cases.
Consequences are not irrelevant, however. Two points should be
noted. First, suppression of the same amount of speech is likely to
produce a higher V if the regulation suppressing it is targeted on a
particular point of view than if it is neutral between competing points
of view. Assume that some regulation reduces all political speech by ten
percent. People will be less well informed, but (with an exception
to be noted later in connection with the issue of public financing of
political campaigns) the only result will be to increase the random
component in public opinion. There will be no bias. If, however, one
point of view is suppressed, public opinion will be biased. The ninety
percent of speech that remains may now contribute little to the infor-
mation of the public-may, indeed, serve merely to misinform. This
is an argument for treating viewpoint restrictions, as in the Hudnut
case (of which more later), 9 with especial severity, though not, I shall
argue, for making them illegal per se.
The opposite of a viewpoint restriction is a restriction incidental
to a goal unrelated to free speech. Such a restriction is more likely
38. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev.
189 (1983).
39. American Bookseller's Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without
opinion, 106 S.Ct. 1172 (1986).
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to generate offsetting benefits than a restriction on viewpoint or
even a restriction that is neutral not only as to viewpoint but
as to content. Compare the following hypothetical cases: a village
converts its only public park into a parking lot; the village forbids
all leafletting, regardless of content (e.g., political, sexual, com-
mercial) or viewpoint (e.g., radical, conservative, feminist). Even if
the reduction in the amount of speech is the same, the benefits of
the parking lot are likely to exceed those of the ban on leafletting
(at least if we suppose that there are plenty of private parks easily
accessible to the public, so that the recreational value of the par-
ticular park is slight). The ban will merely reduce litter and spare
the public the slight inconvenience of being accosted by leafletters.
Of course, an example could be constructed where the incidental
restriction cut down more speech than the direct one. Even here
there would be an argument for treating the former more leniently.
The costs of an incidental restriction, which is to say a restriction
not of speech as such, will not be concentrated on the speakers and
writers of their audience but will be more widely diffused. In the
example of the parking lot, people who used the park for activities
unrelated to speech will also suffer by its conversion to a parking
lot. The groups that have been using the park for speechmaking may
be enemies of the faction that controls the town government, but if
the government retaliates by closing the park, it hurts other users who
may be the government's supporters. This possibility makes it less likely
that the restriction was imposed in order to deter speech rather than
to achieve a lawful collateral goal such as reducing littering. A ban on
speech in the park would not have this two-edged quality. Thus the dis-
tinction between direct and incidental restrictions identifies a class of
cases where the restriction is more likely to be motivated by an imper-
missible, though perhaps unprovable, purpose. In some cases purpose
may be provable directly, and since purpose is probative of conse-
quence, such proof may provide a shortcut to application of the Dennis
formula. Where purpose cannot be proved directly, it may still be
possible to infer improper purpose from the fact that the costs of
a challenged restriction exceed its benefits. But then there is no need
to take the extra step of inferring bad purpose; a restriction that
flunks the Dennis test can be forbidden as violating the first amend-
ment, without more ado.
Here is a different kind of example of the distinction between
direct and incidental regulation of speech. Suppose that as part of
a program of trying to prevent domestic terrorism, government agents
photograph speakers and audiences at the public meetings of a radical
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group. The government in this example has no desire to discourage
people from engaging in radical politics but is aware that radical
groups sometimes resort to terror and therefore deems it prudent
to keep tabs on them. To remove any hint of political bias, assume
that the government monitors right-wing and left-wing radicals with
equal pertinacity. Nevertheless, knowing that the FBI is watching
will discourage some people from joining radical groups and, in turn,
will make the dissemination of radical political messages more costly.
But the repressive effect that is the unintended by-product of regulation
that has other objectives is normally less than that produced by
deliberate (even if, as in my leafletting hypothetical, "content neu-
tral") regulation. Since V is lower, the investigation of radical groups
should be, and perhaps is, subject to less critical review under the
first amendment than efforts to censor or punish the activities of
such groups. 40
A separate point regarding the amount of suppression is its geo-
graphical scope. The degree to which a regulation actually taxes and
thereby represses speech varies with the reach of the authority im-
posing it. This is separate from my earlier point that local regulation
of free speech is less menacing because there is more intergovernmental
competition at the local than at the regional or national levels. That
was a point about the likelihood that free speech would be suppressed
given the mobility of the population; the present point concerns the
size of the affected population. On both counts there is an argument
(how strong, I shall not try to assess) for giving states and municipali-
ties more leeway in regulating speech than the national government has.
c. Market Robustness
The other major factor determining the amount of speech suppressed
is the market's response to suppression. A regulation of free speech
has the same effect on the amount of speech as a tax would have,
and the effect of a given tax on the quantity of the taxed product
depends on the elasticity of demand and supply. The more elastic
the demand and supply, the more the tax will cut back the product's
output. The dominant characteristic of information as an economic
good is that property rights in information are difficult to ob-
tain and maintain; as a result, information is very often a com-
munal good. Except to the extent that patent, copyright, or trade
40. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1015-16 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc).
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secret law enables the social benefits of information (or some
large fraction of them) to be appropriated by the producers, the in-
vestment they make in producing information will benefit others as
well as themselves. As a result the producers will fail to carry the
production of the information to the point where marginal social cost
and marginal social benefit are equated. But supply need not be highly
elastic at the point to which production is carried. Suppose that before
the tax on (= regulation of) speech is imposed, the output of infor-
mation is only two-thirds what it would be if social and private benefits
in this market coincided, and that the tax reduces output by ten per-
cent; then the reduction is actually less than it would be if output
were greater.
There is, however, some danger that the tax might push the supply
curve so far to the left that it no longer intersects the demand curve,
with the result that some type of information will cease to be produced
at all. Of course any business can be destroyed by taxes; but if the
output of information is anyway quite low because many of its benefits
are external to the producer, the danger that a tax will drive that
output to zero is greater than in other markets. Granted, the fact
that the output of some type of information falls far short of the
optimal level may show not that the output is small but only that
its external benefits are great. The producer may still be quite robust
in a financial sense, as are the television networks, for example, or
the New York Times. But this is small consolation to the marginal
producer of ideas-as the producer of a new idea will often be. Here
the private demand curve may lie everywhere below the supply curve
even though the social demand curve may lie above it.
These relationships are shown graphically in Figure 1. The robust
producer, before the tax is imposed, produces quantity qP of infor-
mation. The socially optimal quantity would be q, the intersection
of supply with a demand curve in which all benefits from the infor-
mation are included. The tax reduces the producer's output from q,
to q,,. If the producer were so marginal that he produced only qp,,
the imposition of the tax would reduce his output to zero, compared
to the socially optimal output of q ,.
Moreover, if it is true that the main benefits of information are
external, anything that raises the costs of producing information
is questionable on its face. It would be distinctly odd if, for example,
the government decided to tax charities as a means of raising revenue.
Indeed, a frequent common law response to the problem of external
benefits is to allow the enterprise to externalize some of its costs;
this is the economic rationale of the traditional, though now almost
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vanished, tort immunity of charitable enterprises. 4' If the first amend-
ment is conceived as intended to foster a flourishing market in ideas
and opinions, there is an argument for regarding special taxes on
books, magazines, newspapers, or television stations as abridgments
of free speech, even if there is no danger that the taxes would actually
drive a significant number of these enterprises out of business and
even if the motivations for the tax, so far as they are knowable,
are purely fiscal. 2 Some producers might be driven out of business
41. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 59 n.51 (mimeo.,
March 1986; forthcoming, Harvard University Press).
42. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
591-93 (1983).
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and in any event their output of ideas and opinions would be driven
even further below the optimal level.
A further point, of great importance with regard to political speech,
concerns the role of interest groups in the political process. If some
government program will yield concentrated benefits to a small group
but impose diffuse costs on many others, the members of the benefited
group will have an incentive to band together and contribute resources
to propagating their point of view. The potential victims of the pro-
gram, however, may each be so slightly affected that the expected
private gain from contributing to a joint effort would be zero. Then
the problem will be worse than a mere underproduction of informa-
tion, since proponents of the program would have no incentive to
refrain from outrageous misrepresentations of its likely effects. Here
the value of a free press is very great.
At the opposite extreme from the political market, some information
markets seem not to be afflicted by problems of external benefits. Most
of the benefits of advertising a particular brand of good or service-a
particular brand of personal computers, for example-are captured
by the producer of that brand (though the advertising may convey
some information about computers in general, on which producers
of other brands can take a free ride). This may be why commercial
speech has received less judicial protection than political, scientific,
and artistic expression. 3 Statements of intention ("your money or
your life") are similar in this regard, as is pornography, defined as
speech or writing (usually pictorial) designed to arouse sexually. The
consumer benefits of pornography are captured by the pornographer
in the price of the pornographic work. There are no external benefits.
At the opposite extreme from cases where the potential and the ac-
tual audience for a work coincide is the case of a basic scientific,
ethical political, aesthetic, or religious idea. The potential audience
through the ages may greatly exceed the audience of the original ex-
43. See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amend-
ment, 65 VA. L, REv. 1 (1979). These authors conclude, by a different route, that commercial
speech should receive no protection under the first amendment. Their conclusion is based on
the argument that speech designed to promote the sale of specific goods is no more entitled to
constitutional protection than the sale of the goods themselves. It is not the sort of thing
endangered by majorities, as political and some scientific and artistic expression is; more
precisely it is no more endangered than the sale of the goods themselves, which has no
constitutional protection to speak of. If commercial speech yielded external benefits, this would
be an argument for giving it more protection from government regulation than the sale of
the goods themselves; but brand-specific commercial speech does not yield significant external
benefits. I come back to commercial speech in Part IV A.
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positor of the idea; the difference is a measure of the idea's external
benefits.
But we must turn to the demand side of the market in information
to understand fully the concern with overdeterring speech by reg-
ulation. The demand for some sorts of information probably is highly
elastic, implying that a tax would curtail output substantially. This
seems particularly true of political information, even if it is con-
sidered the category of highest social value. The main use to which
that information is actually put is not, as one might suppose, as
an input into voting, but as entertainment. Its private value as an
input into voting is small because of the extremely limited private
(not social) value of voting itself, which is due to the facts that no
election in any but the tiniest political subdivisions is ever decided by
one vote and that the voter votes for candidates rather than specific
programs. People do vote, of course, despite the lack of instrumental
value to voting; they evidently derive some consumption value from
it (which is to say, economists don't understand why people vote).
That value is, however, modest, as shown by the relatively low turn-
out in most American elections despite great efforts by the political
parties to drum up interest in elections and make it easy for their
supporters to get to the polling booths. The modest value that most
people attach to voting suggests that they probably attach little value
to political information and hence will readily substitute other forms
of news and entertainment if the price of political information rises
because of a tax, whether directly or by regulation, on the sources
of that information. This may be why most television news is packaged
and formatted as entertainment rather than information.
Thus, there is a triple externality in political information. Interest
groups bias it; resources devoted to gathering and disseminating it
inure to the benefit of free riders who pick it up and reprint or
rebroadcast it; and resources devoted to studying and absorbing it
produce benefits for the polity as a whole but not for the individual
voter, since a single vote cannot swing the election. No other form
of speech is so unlikely to be underproduced; commercial speech,
pornography, and statements of intention, I have argued, are unlikely
to be underproduced at all.
So far, I have been assuming a tax on, or regulation of, political
information generally. If the government attempts to suppress one
type of political information-maybe one point of view-plenty of
substitutes will emerge within the overall field of political opinion.
The effect of suppression will be similar from a private standpoint
to the effect on consumers' choices of a merger that eliminates one
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brand in a market in which there are hundreds of different brands.
This point is not limited to political information. If James Joyce's
Ulysses is suppressed, thousands of other novels may provide a sub-
stitute. Even if the whole category of sexually explicit literature is
suppressed (not that Ulysses is explicit by contemporary standards),
that still leaves plenty of substitutes in literature that treat sex more
obliquely.
This may seem to make "viewpoint" restrictions less harmful than
more general restrictions. They would be, if the substitutes were
socially as well as privately adequate. But the substitutes may be
much less valuable from a social than from a private standpoint.
Most people do not care a fig about being denied access to the
extremes of the political spectrum, yet to the extent that these extremes
are sources of good (as well as bad) ideas, the social cost of sup-
pressing them may be considerable. Most readers were not troubled
back in the 1920's by being denied access to an experimental novel
such as Ulysses, yet experimental works of literature have sometimes
proved immensely influential in the long run; Ulysses has. Nor is it
an answer that influence does not depend on the number of copies
sold. The fewer the expected sales, the smaller the incentive to create
the experimental work; and although pecuniary incentives are not the
only incentives operating on creative writers and other artists, they
cannot be wholly discounted. There will be less experimentation if
the financial rewards are systematically reduced because of suppres-
sion. There will be much less if the suppressed works have good private
substitutes. New ideas may never get a hearing.
The upshot of this analysis is to restore political speech to its status
as principal beneficiary of the first amendment's speech and press
clause, and put commerical speech and pornography on a lower rung-
without, however, having to make judgments about the relative social
value of political and other ideas. Political speech simply is more
vulnerable to suppression by government regulation than other forms
of speech, especially when the regulation seeks to suppress particular
and perhaps unpopular viewpoints. But this does not justify the con-
clusion that political speech can never be regulated; we have yet to
consider other elements in the Dennis formula besides the value of
the information suppressed by a challenged regulation.
2. The Costs of Error
The second factor in the expanded Dennis formula, E, the costs
of legal error, has played a significant role in discussions of the regula-
tion of speech and writing, and rightly so. Several reasons why these
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costs are high can be distinguished. The first is the partiality of the
decisionmaker.44 This distinction is primarily important with regard
to political speech. Speech that is revolutionary in intent, or even
just critical of the government, is apt to be resented by judges or
administrators. As part of the government, of the "system," they
often are interested parties in the dispute they are called on to decide.
Their impartiality is in question, and with it the accuracy of their
judgments.
Another reason is closely related, but is not limited to political
speech. Judges and administrators are for the most part middle-
aged, upper-middle-class, politically and socially conventional men
and (increasingly) women. Ideas directed at the young, the bohemian,
the deviant, the extremist, and other marginal portions of the spectrum
of tastes and preferences are likely to leave these officials quite cold.
Of course much that judges are called on to evaluate in other areas
of their jurisdiction is also alien to their experience-the behavior
of violent criminals, for example. But there, at least, the focus is
on something external, tangible-the violent act-and on the infer-
ences that can be drawn from it about the social value of the defend-
ant's conduct. The evaluation of a work of (purported) art is more
difficult and uncertain. Therefore the values, experiences, and pre-
conceptions of the adjudicator are likely to play a more important
role-and may differ sharply from those of the intended audience
of the work. This, by the way, is an argument for using juries in
free-speech cases, and therefore an argument for preferring criminal
punishment to censorship (unless juries are used to censor!), since
juries are a broader cross-section of the population than judges and
administrators. On the other hand, juries are generally less well-
educated and, in our society at any rate, educated people tend to
be more tolerant than the uneducated or the less well-educated.
Then there is the well-known difficulty of evaluating the costs and
benefits of particular ideas by the methods of litigation or admin-
istration. As noted earlier, even category judgments, such as whether
a given writing is political or scientific or artistic, or whether it
is advocacy or threat, are often problematical, and this is a prag-
matic reason for extending first amendment protections beyond the
political category, even if (or perhaps especially if) that is the most
important category. Not only is much literature overtly or covertly
political (Swift, Orwell, Solzhenitsyn, Harriet Beecher Stowe, etc.)
but, depending on the actual or advocated scope of political action,
44. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 34, at 81-82.
19861
HeinOnline  -- 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 25 1986
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
apolitical literature may have strong political overtones. A book
portraying homosexuality in a sympathetic light might be used to
urge the passage of laws forbidding discrimination against homo-
sexuals even if such use were foreign to the author's purposes in
writing the book. With the expansion of the modern state, more
and more formerly private concerns have become political-which
makes it even less surprising that the legal concept of free speech
has expanded beyond the narrowly political realm. A further point
is that particular forms of artistic expression may become associated
with particular political standpoints. For example, the apparent dis-
order and sexual explicitness of much modern art and literature have
seemed to parallel and reinforce the liberal political agenda, so that
efforts to suppress such art and literature could be viewed as placing
a price on a particular point of view (much the same can be said,
however, about efforts to suppress the drug traffic). The line between
the political and the scientific or technical is equally blurred. Much
scientific research, especially in biology, economics, and weapon tech-
nologies, has political implications.
At the level of the particular speech, writing, or work of art sought
to be suppressed, the censor or court is asked to compare the harm
from the challenged expression with its truth, or in the case of art
its beauty (a word I use to denote any type of aesthetic value). Both
sides of the comparison involve daunting problems of a kind the
legal system is poorly designed to solve. The law's evidentiary methods
may be fairly well adapted to determining the facts of an accident case,
a criminal charge, or a contract dispute, and perhaps they are also
(if barely) usable for resolving more complex cases, for example anti-
trust cases involving such difficult economic issues as market power and
economies of scale. But they seem pretty hopeless for resolving dif-
ficult questions of political or scientific truth and consequence, or
aesthetic value and consequence, either on the cost or benefit side.
I shall deal with the cost side later, when I discuss probability
and magnitude of harm in the expanded Dennis formula. On the
benefit side, the point to be stressed is that the truth of many ideas
and the beauty of most art cannot be resolved by any forensic proc-
ess, but must be left to the verdict of time. Neither Copernicus' theory
of the solar system nor Einstein's theories of relativity could be
verified at the time they were announced (let alone by a court!).
Nor could Shakespeare have been pronounced a great writer at the
time his plays were written. Shakespeare himself apparently did not
realize he was a great writer, at least of plays, for he made no effort
to revise them for publication, to get them published, or even to
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preserve the manuscripts. 4 The ideas that exercise people today, such
as Freud's theory of the unconscious, the ideas of sociobiology, the
Marxist approach to economics, concepts of racial and sexual equality,
or gradual versus punctuated evolution, are similarly not susceptible
at present of confirmation or refutation. Their truth (defined for
this purpose as the agreement of all persons deemed rational) will
be resolved (if ever) only in a "marketplace of ideas" unfolding
through decades, perhaps even centuries.
It is in regard to ideas that are not verifiable by scientific or
logical methods, either not in the short run or not ever, that the
concept of the marketplace of ideas comes into its own. That all
ideas are of this nature was a view congenial to Holmes' extreme
skepticism, but is not widely shared. The truths of science may be
provisional, but it seems odd to say that the proposition that the
earth is round is true because people believe it is true, rather than
to say that people believe it to be true because it has been verified
(e.g., by voyages of circumnavigation or by observing the earth from
outer space). But many ideas, most clearly about matters of ethics
and aesthetics, really are not verifiable, not yet anyway.
Although the costs of trying to determine forensically the truth
of such ideas may be infinite, it does not follow that the Dennis
formula implies that regulating speech is never justified. Some speech
("your money or your life," again) makes no claim to have social
value and can thus be distinguished from speech advocating criminal
conduct on the basis of premises (poverty, injustice, etc.) that may
contain valuable ideas, though maybe, as I said earlier, the advocacy
and the premises can be separated. Other speech makes claims of
a sort not so difficult to resolve forensically, as where a book promises
its readers to reveal to them the secret of living forever. The more
ridiculous the claim, of course, the easier it is to refute forensically;
perhaps that is what "ridiculous" means in this setting. Or if a
magazine article asserts that some public official has a criminal record,
ascertaining the truth of this assertion should pose no special dif-
ficulties. Notice that this point cuts across the categories of speech;
it is as applicable to political speech as to any other form of speech.
A more fundamental point is that E in the Dennis formula is not
the cost of reducing the risk of error to zero, which often would
be utterly prohibitive. It is, instead, the sum of the costs of trying
to minimize error through more elaborate or careful procedures and
45. See Bevington, General Introduction to THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 2, 79
(D. Bevington 3d ed. 1980).
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the costs of the errors that remain. If the cost of reducing error
is very high, minimizing this sum may imply tolerating a lot of error.
That need not be a socially costly consequence. It depends on how
much speech is erroneously suppressed. It may be quite impossible to
discover which pornographic works of art have significant aesthetic
value and which have not, but if only a small amount of art is sup-
pressed as pornography (perhaps just "hard core" pornography-
whatever is most distressing to contemporary mores), the error costs
may not be great, because so much remains available. An even better
example is a zoning ordinance that confines pornographic bookstores
and movie houses to a particular part of town, and thus merely raises
slightly the costs to the purveyors of pornography (whatever its social
value) of reaching their customers." The more general point illustrated
by this example is that error costs may not be great if the government
does not ban a particular work but merely alters the time, manner,
and place of expression, even if the regulation is not "content neutral"
(as it is not in the pornography zoning case); if it is content neutral,
then no judgments at all about truth or beauty will be made,"7 and
E, at least, will be very low. This consideration, rather than the amount
of speech suppressed by the two sorts of restriction, may explain
why the latter, the "content neutral" sort, is treated more permissively.
I have assumed up to now that it is impossibly difficult to make
value distinctions within the very broad categories of information that
I have been examining (I have suggested other types of distinction,
though). But the assumption is exaggerated. In Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., the Supreme Court said, "the customary 'barroom' type of nude
dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expres-
sion."" 8 The pun is cute; but surely the Court could just have said,
topless barroom dancing is not within the constitutional concept of
free speech. Cultural relativism, although the dominant attitude toward
things cultural of modern educated Americans, so that a distinguished
judge can say of the word "f....," "one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric," ' 9 at some point becomes silly, by giving tolerance lexical priority
over every other social value. Although topless dancing has some value,
since there is, after all, a market for it, that value is too small to
46. Such ordinances were upheld in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
72-73 (1976), and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 27 (1986). See also
Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1398 (8th Cir. 1985).
47. At least a court won't make such judgments. The motivation for the regulation may
be aesthetic, as in a law banning highway billboards.
48. 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
49. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (Harlan, J.).
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justify the costs to the legal system of litigating over its constitutional-
ity, and there are both good substitutes and no danger of underproduc-
tion such as might warrant extraordinary legal protections. The max-
im de minimis non curat lex can be given an economic meaning: do
not intervene judicially if the costs of intervention exceed the poten-
tial stakes in the dispute. This principle is applicable to constitutional
law in general and topless dancing in particular.
C. The Benefits of Suppression
1. Probability of Harm
Having considered the left-hand side of the expanded Dennis for-
mula, I turn now to the right-hand side, where the first element is
the probability of harm if the speech in question is allowed. The word
''clear" in Holmes' formula "clear and present danger""5 captures
this element with Holmes' characteristic concision. The clearer the
danger, the more likely it is to occur. Soliciting to commit a crime
creates a clear danger; selling a pornographic book creates a less clear
danger because the consequences of pornography are unclear.
The economic objection to Holmes' formula is that it confines
regulation to cases where P is high and where L is not reduced as
a result of division by (1 + i)', because n = 0. This is an arbitrary
subset of the cases where regulation is cost-justified. If, for example,
L is very great, this could offset both a low P and the fact that
L is subject to discounting because it is a future rather than a present
danger. Even if both P and L (appropriately discounted) are low,
regulation may be justified if V and E are also low-which is true
in the case of obscenity, as we shall see. Holmes' formula isolates
relevant factors, which is all to the good, but it is not a comprehensive
formula for deciding whether regulation of speech is justified; the
expanded Dennis formula is.
The examples of soliciting for a crime, on the one hand, and
selling a pornographic book, on the other, suggest the important
point that P in the Dennis formula will generally be greater (or,
equivalently, the danger will be "clearer") if the danger is to a third
party rather than to the speaker's audience. A member of the audience
is better able to protect himself from the speaker, simply by not
listening, than a nonmember is. If A pays B to kill C, he is placing
B in jeopardy of criminal liability, but it seems plain that the focus
of our concern should be with the danger to C. This is not to say
50. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
HeinOnline  -- 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 29 1986
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
that we should never worry about speech that harms only the listener.
Fraud would be an obvious example of speech in which the listener
is squarely in the zone of danger. In general, however, the danger
of speech is clearer, the more calculated it is to stir up the audience
against others. Indeed, speech of this kind generates external effects
of the kind that provide a conventional justification for regulation.
The relevance of the external character of the harm caused by a
particular speech or writing is widely recognized in the case of public
displays of obscenity. The least controversial case for suppressing free
speech is forbidding the advertising of pornographic materials by
billboards or other displays that are themselves pornographic. Such
displays cause offense to people who are not customers for porno-
graphy in the same way that a polluting factory injures persons who
are not customers for the factory's goods and are not otherwise in
an actual or potential contractual relationship with the factory. It seems
arbitrary, however, to confine concern with the external harms from
speech to the case of obscene advertising, just because of its transparent
analogy to a common law private nuisance. And we do not; if A
tells B to go out and kill C, the speech produces, as I have said,
a conventional externality, though not described as such in the literature
of free speech, and is uncontroversially punishable. What is less widely
recognized is that if a white supremacist orator tells his entirely white
audience that black people are vicious and degenerate, any resulting
harms to blacks are an external effect of the speech.
The element of external harm is part of the explanation for why the
speech of Nazis or Ku Klux Klansmen poses a greater danger than
speech which asks the audience to alter its own way of life. It also
suggests a ground for questioning the much publicized decision that
the Nazis must be allowed to parade through the predominantly Jewish
town of Skokie, a suburb of Chicago.5' Given the make-up of the
town's population, it was unlikely (to say the least) that the Nazis
wanted to use the parade for the dissemination of their ideas; from
the standpoint of communication it was like making a speech in an
empty room. In these circumstances V was very low (quite apart from
the fact that the denial of a parade permit in one suburb restricted
only one mode of expression in one small area of the country) and
was probably outweighed by PL, where L was the offensiveness of
the parade to the people of Skokie, some of whom were survivors
51. See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 700-01 (N.D. 111.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978); Horowitz & Bramson, Skokie, the ACLU and the Endurance of Democratic Theory,
43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1979).
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of Nazi concentration camps. Moreover, the ordinary presumption
in law that an intended harm is more likely to materialize than an
unintended one is relevant in suggesting that PL really was large, for
the purpose of the parade was to offend, in the hope that its offensive-
ness and the possibility that it would provoke violence would attract
media coverage. A further point bearing on P is that a parade is
an emotive form of expression, especially a Nazi parade with its
paramilitary uniforms, its swastikas and songs, its undertone of intimi-
dation, and (in the heyday of Nazism) its torchlight rallies and massed
banners. These paraphernalia are used not to persuade the mind but
to obstruct thought; they distort the operation of the market in ideas
and they make it more difficult to correct erroneous ideas. Like fraud,
the emotive devices employed in parades and other demonstrations
promote market failure. The case for regulation is therefore stronger
than it would be if a more intellectual mode of expression were at
issue. I shall return to the distinction between emotional and intellectual
expression shortly when I discuss the different standards for regulating
electronic and print media.
L in the Skokie case deserves additional consideration. Many ideas
are offensive, but ordinarily the harm is a slight and diffuse one.
Focused or targeted harassment, as in a case of defamation, is apt
to generate a greater, or at least more readily quantifiable, harm.
If the Nazi party addressed hate mail to known survivors of Nazi
concentration camps, it would inflict the kind of injury for which
the common law conventionally awards damages under such rubrics
as intentional infliction of emotional distress. Perhaps the Skokie
case was sufficiently analogous to come within the orbit of common
law principles that survive defenses based on the first amendment.
I do not want to be understood as arguing that the Skokie case
was. in fact decided incorrectly. The big objection to allowing Skokie
to deny a parade permit was E, the costs of erroneous suppression
of lawful speech. Although I think I have given pretty persuasive
reasons for distinguishing between a Nazi march in Skokie and a civil
rights march in Selma, scholars less trusting of judicial discretion than
I may consider the distinctions too fine to be entrusted to the judiciary
and may prefer to err on the side of tolerance.
The second half of Holmes' formula ("and present danger") is
also relevant to P (and to L, as we shall see shortly) in two ways.
First, the more remote the danger, the more time there is for the
marketplace in ideas to prevent the danger from materializing by
correcting any falsities in the speech. As with ordinary markets, the
market in ideas requires time for consumers to compare competing
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offers. The spellbinder who sweeps a crowd off its feet short-circuits
a competitive process in which rival spellbinders vie for the crowd's
support.
Second, the further the harm lies in the future, the less likely it
is to materialize, because other factors, unrelated to the vigor of
counteradvocacy, may neutralize it. In retrospect, it is fairly plain that
the Communist Party, U.S.A. would have won few converts to its
cause even if it had not been harassed by the federal government in the
late 1940's and early 1950's. This is because, beginning with the
suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956, the Soviet model became
progressively less attractive to Americans. This is slightly different
from Learned Hand's point in Dennis that "the reliability of a guess
decreases with the length of the future which it seeks to penetrate. '" '52
All this means is that the more remote the harm, the larger the
standard deviation of L. L, the mean of the estimated distribution
of likely harms, is unchanged. I am suggesting that the further L
lies in the future, the less likely it is to come to pass; there is time
to head it off-and not only by counteradvocacy. However, I acknowl-
edge the possibility that the passage of time might render some ideas
more dangerous; altered social conditions might provide a tinder lack-
ing when the ideas were first expounded. Marxism illustrates this point.
Several other factors bear on P:
(1) The structure of the communications media. Can rival ideas get
a hearing? One rationale for the Supreme Court's allowing public
figures fewer remedies under the law of defamation than it allows
private figures is, as we shall see, that the former have better market
remedies, i.e., can more easily get the media to carry their rebuttal
to any defamation that the media carry.
(2) The level of education of the population. The higher it is, the
better the market for ideas will operate (because the cost of dis-
tinguishing true from false ideas will be lower) and hence the less
need there will be for public regulation of that market. Rising levels
of education may explain the trend toward a more expansive inter-
pretation of the first amendment.
(3) The stability of a nation's political institutions. The more stable
they are, the less dangerous is advocacy intended to subvert them. The
United States can afford to be more tolerant of subversive political
expression than an unstable "Third World" country could be. This
conclusion may reflect, however, a concealed preference for stability
over other social values. It could be argued that a country is unstable
52. 183 F.2d at 212.
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in proporation to the opportunities for social improvement through
violent revolution. I don't agree. Most revolutions have been failures,
and have made the societies in which they occurred worse off. Ob-
viously I cannot develop this point within the compass of this already
too long paper.
(4) The speaker's intent. As I have already suggested, harm is more
likely to occur if it is intended than if it is the accidental byproduct
of activity having quite other purposes. If a speaker sets out to cause
harm, we are entitled to assume that P is higher than it would be
if the intent were otherwise
(5) The degree to which the speaker is appealing to the audience's
self-interest (the case dramatically illustrated by Marc Antony's speech
to the Roman mob in Julius Caesar). Because self-interest is generally
a more powerful motive than altruism is, speech is more likely to
be dangerous if it appeals to the self-interest rather than the
benevolence of the audience. This is connected to my earlier point
about external effects. A speaker who urges his listeners to loot the
stores in their neighborhoods is more likely to persuade than if he
urges them to burn down their own homes. A speaker who urges
his audience to despoil the bosses is more likely to persuade than
a speaker who urges his audience to give up their property to the
poor. The point is not limited to fomenting criminal activity. The
politician who assembles a coalition by promising to redistribute wealth
to its members from the rest of society is more likely to persuade
than the politician who advocates a redistribution in the other direction.
(6) The feasibility of waiting for the completed crime to occur.
Punishing advocacy is a branch (or extension) of the law of attempts.
There is a solid economic rationale for punishing attempts.53 Neverthe-
less in some cases waiting for the completed crime to occur and punish-
ing it instead of the attempt may be an adequate substitute. The more
serious the crime, the stronger the argument for punishing the at-
tempt; and if the completed crime would be particularly serious-
if it would involve violence on a large scale-there is an argument
for stretching the concept of attempt, which is what laws forbidding
the advocacy of revolutionary violence in effect accomplish. Notice
also that where the harm done by a speech or writing does not re-
quire the mediation of another criminal actor, the attempt and the com-
pleted crime merge. This is true of defamation, of obscenity sought
to be suppressed because it is offensive rather than because it causes
53. See Posner, supra note 37, at 1217-18; Shavell, supra note 37, at 1249-53.
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sex crimes, and of noisy or otherwise disruptive methods of expres-
sion, such as soundtrucks. Notice, finally, how viewing the punish-
ment of dangerous speech as an application of the law of criminal
attempts brings out the basic similarity between criminal punishment of
speech and censorship of speech. Both are preventive, viewed ex ante.
2. Magnitude of Harm
The last element in the expanded Dennis formula is L, the mag-
nitude of the harm if it materializes. The main point that requires
explanation is discounting to present value. As between two
catastrophes, one of which will occur tomorrow and the other in forty
years, most of us think the former prospect the more costly. But this
point was rejected by Hand in Dennis when he stated that to dis-
count the estimated harm of a violent Communist revolution to present
value would betoken "an indifference to those who come after us.'""
This was a critical step in his analysis; it allowed him to figure the
costs of violent revolution as if it were to occur tomorrow, and not
in twenty, fifty, or one hundred years, discounting only for the proba-
bility that it would actually occur some day and not for its remoteness.
This failure to discount is questionable. Perhaps the social discount
rate should be lower than the private rate, in recognition of the fact
that the interests of the unborn figure in the latter only insofar as
we the living feel altruistic toward our descendants. But should it be
zero? If the question were whether to devote a given amount of
resources to preventing a violent revolution in one hundred years,
or an equivalent disaster in ten, the common-sense answer would be
the latter; and that implies a positive social discount rate.
Common sense may not be good enough, though. The issue of the
social discount rate also has a philosophical dimension. If society is
viewed as composed of the unborn as well as the born (as in the moral
philosophy of John Rawls") then even if people feel no altruism
toward their descendants (though they must feel some, or they wouldn't
produce descendants), there is a social obligation to the unborn; and
if the unborn are valued as highly as the born, then perhaps the
social discount rate should be zero. On the other hand, as Rawls
recognizes, the progress of knowledge is such that future generations
are likely to be better off than the present one even if little current
54. 183 F.2d at 212.
55. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE I, 284-93 (1971). For an interesting economic
analysis of the question of a positive social discount rate see Olson & Bailey, Positive Time
Preference, 89 J. POL. EcON. I (1981).
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consumption is forgone for their benefit.5" If we assume that 100
years from now society will be better able to absorb a disaster of
a specified magnitude than it will be ten years from now, it makes
sense to devote greater resources to averting the more imminent
disaster. Moreover, most people would say that while we have some
duties to the unborn, we are not merely trustees of society, we are
entitled to give some preference to our own interests over those of
future generations. Finally, if a future harm is of a sort likely to
bring about a permanent reduction in the society's well-being, then
the further in the future it lies the less harm it will do; it will differ
from the present harm only in being of shorter duration, but this
is enough to justify a lesser expenditure on trying to prevent it.
The curious upshot of all this is that the more "future regarding"
we are, the less we shall discount future harm in free-speech cases
by their remoteness: an interesting example of how two "liberal"
ideas (free speech, and regard for future generations) can conflict.
But even if the social discount rate is set equal to the private discount
rate (say as measured by the interest rate on long-term securities),
remote harms, if large enough, will sometimes merit immediate cor-
rective measures. This is the essential modification that Hand made
in Dennis in the clear and present danger formula. But cases since
Dennis, notably Brandenburg v. Ohio," imply that remote harms,
however great (even after full discounting), can never provide a lawful
basis for suppressing advocacy. This is wrong in theory, though
maybe not in practice. If, in the late 1920's, the consequences of
Nazism has been foreseeable, the Weimar Republic would have been
wise to suppress the Nazi Party (in fact it made half-hearted at-
tempts to do so). I would not like to think that, under such cir-
cumstances in this country, the first amendment would stand in
the way, as Brandenburg implies it would. The only, but immense,
problem is that political changes are notoriously difficult to foresee.
Just as a large L might offset a low P or a large n (that is, a
long interval until L will come to pass), so a small L might offset
a high P. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California," suggested that the advocacy of peaceful, nondestructive
trespassing could not be punished constitutionally even if the advocacy
was quite likely to succeed (high P), because the harm if it did
56. See J. RAwLs, supra note 55, at 287.
57. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
58. 274 U.S. 357. 378 (1927).
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succeed would be small (low L). In such a case the information
value of the advocacy-more precisely of the intellectual grounds on
which the speaker urged his listeners to trespass-would exceed PL,
the expected social cost of the advocacy.
D. More Suppression-or Less?
The preceding sections may seem to imply liberalizing the restrictions
that the Supreme Court has placed on the government's authority
to regulate free speech, but this is not necessarily correct. E, the
costs of erroneous suppression of free speech and a key component
of the Dennis formula, must be considered. If E were slight, the
formula would indeed point to granting more regulatory latitude to
government, but E may actually be very high. The regulation of
speech is as delicate a task of government as can be imagined. Even
the most casual acquaintance with the scholarship on regulation en-
genders doubt about whether American government is capable of
even the cruder forms of regulation, let alone the more delicate sorts.
Its success in regulating foods, drugs, transportation, and pollution
is not so striking as to create confidence in its ability to regulate
speech and writing. As I said earlier, the history of efforts to regulate
speech and writing is a remarkable record of mistakes and futility,
and there is no reason to think we can do better if only we try
harder. Maybe the Supreme Court is to be congratulated for having
"deregulated" the market in ideas more completely than Congress
has been able to deregulate the transportation or financial markets.
Thus, properly understood (that is, with due emphasis on E), the
modified Dennis formula need not imply a broader scope of regulation
of speech and writings than alternative formulations.
IV. THE ECONOMIC MODEL APPLIED
A. The General Structure of Free-Speech Law
1. Political Speech
The economic argument for regulating speech is weakest in the
case of political advocacy. The costs (both V and E) of regulating
political speech are very high, while the benefits, in a stable society
with a well-educated population, normally are quite low. In particular,
both P and L, and therefore PL, are apt to be low in the case, which is
most common, where the harm from such advocacy lies in the indefinite
future. One would therefore expect, and finds, that the earliest cases
striking down regulations of free speech involved political advocacy,
that these cases are still regarded as the core of the first amendment's
[Vol. XX: I
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protection of free speech, and that efforts to monitor rather than
suppress such advocacy are, as mentioned earlier, treated more per-
missively. Other respects in which current doctrine seems conformable
to an economic approach are the greater latitude allowed the gov-
ernment in regulating the time, place, and manner of political ad-
vocacy, as distinct from its content, and, less obviously, the greater
latitude allowed the government in propagating a particular point
of view as distinct from suppressing private expression. 9 If the gov-
ernment spends money to advocate a patriotic point of view or to
discourage abortions, this makes it costlier for private persons to
communicate an opposing point of view, but the cost still is less
than that of suppression. It is all, of course, a matter of degree.
If private education were outlawed and the federal government im-
posed a uniform, highly politicized curriculum on all public schools
in the country, the suppression of speech would be very serious. 6°
But that would be a case of a governmental near monopoly of in-
formation, rather than of merely adding the government as one com-
petitive voice to the many already participating in the market of
ideas. Indeed, in the former case (monopoly) V is much greater
than if education is decentralized; in the latter case V is less than
it would be if the government kept silent.
The major respects in which current doctrine governing the reg-
ulation of political advocacy seems out of step with an economic
approach are (1) the refusal to allow state and local government more
regulatory latitude than the federal government, (2) the refusal to allow
remote but large harms ever to be compared with small but imminent
ones (Brandenburg, at least when read literally), and (3) a related
point, a disinclination to consider harms at all, unless they are utterly
concrete. Regarding (2), the Dennis decision may or may not have
been wrong (ex post, probably wrong) in its conclusion that the threat
of violent revolution posed by the Communist Party, discounted by
the probability (as well as futurity) of such an event, exceeded the
costs of suppression. But the approach taken-the factors considered
and the relationship among them-was approximately correct, though,
as I have suggested, unduly stacked in the government's favor by refus-
ing to discount for futurity. Yet apparently it is no longer the law.
Both the first and the third points are illustrated by the Hudnut deci-
sion from which I quoted a passage in Part I. At issue was the constitu-
tionality of Indianapolis' anti-pornography ordinance. The ordinance
59. On the general subject see Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565 (1980).
60. Cf. van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to In-
culcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REv. 197, 297 (1983).
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was directed at sexually explicit writings, pictures, and other forms
of expression, whether or not obscene in the usual sense, that por-
tray women in degrading situations, for example as enjoying pain
or humilitation or as deriving pleasure from being raped. In defense
of the ordinance the city presented empirical evidence that such
materials incite rape and other brutalities against women. The court
could have dismissed this evidence as weak and unconvincing (low
P) but did not. Instead the court assumed that the evidence was
wholly convincing, 6' but concluded nonetheless that the ordinance
was invalid because it sought to suppress a point of view, however
vicious and evil in its consequences. This approach is inconsistent
with Dennis, because it invalidates a regulation of speech when PL
is (assumed to be) great and V low. (V is low not because the idea
that women are naturally subordinate to men is necessarily a worthless
idea-it certainly has a long pedigree in social thought-but because
the ordinance, being limited to sexually explicit materials, allowed
plenty of other vehicles for the expression of the idea.) Under Dennis,
pernicious beliefs can be punished on the basis of their probable con-
sequences even if the beliefs have some, or for that matter considerable,
truth value." It all depends on how V and PL balance out. There
is no basis in the formula for an absolute prohibition against viewpoint
restrictions.
This point is particularly important when one considers that the
harms which a law is validly concerned with preventing may be a
function of a particular viewpoint. The Indianapolis ordinance would
apparently have fared better in the courts if it had punished sexually
explicit material which showed men being degraded by women as well
as material that showed women being degraded by men. But as no one
supposes that any form of pornography results in crimes by women
against men, to prohibit pornography in which women are shown in-
flicting pain on men would flunk a Dennis test because PL would
be so low. There is a sense in which the Indianapolis ordinance, by
confining its prohibitions to those forms of pornography likely (or
so the court assumed) to inflict substantive evils which government
has every right to prevent, was as narrowly drawn as could be. Ordi-
narily this would have strengthened the case for upholding the or-
dinance, but in Hudnut it had the opposite effect.
An unfortunate aspect of the decision is that the ordinance was
61. 771 F.2d at 329 n.2.
62. Cf. McCloskey, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits (!). in FREEDOM OF Ex-
PRESSION, 42, 56-57 (F. Berger ed. 1980).
63. 771 F.2d at 334.
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successfully challenged before it went into effect. The empirical
evidence presented in support of the ordinance was weak, in part
because states and cities are not allowed to experiment in the area
of speech. There will never be an opportunity to test empirically the
claims made by the draftsmen of the Indianapolis ordinance on its
behalf.
2. The Greater Protection of the Print Media
In many though not all respects, as we have seen, free-speech law
seems to conform to the implications of economic analysis. Another
example is the much-derided distinction between the print and elec-
tronic media, the former receiving more protection than the latter."
To try to ground the distinction in the physical limitations of the
electromagnetic spectrum, as the Supreme Court has done, is indeed
economic nonsense, since the print media are in fact subject to more
acute scarcities than those that affect radio and television." The real
distinction lies in the different educational levels of the audiences for
books, magazines, and newspapers, on the one hand, and for radio
and television on the other, and also (and relatedly), in the different
emotional impact of written compared to visual or oral communica-
tion. Readers are on average (an important qualification!) better
educated than viewers and listeners, precisely because the print media
are addressed to a more reflective sensibility than the pictorial, and
to a lesser extent the aural, media. The ratio of information to emo-
tional arousal is greater in the print than in the other media. On aver-
age, therefore, the marketplace for ideas operates more effectively
with respect to the printed word than with respect to pictures and
sounds and so there is less need for government regulation. P in the
Dennis formula is lower.
3. Commercial Advertising
Also sensible from an economic standpoint is the lesser protection
given to speech or writing that is intended as commercial advertising,
or that is defamatory, or that is sexually explicit. In the first case
the obvious but not the only point is the lower E than exists in the case
of political, artistic, or scientific ideas and opinions. A false represen-
tation regarding the price, quality, or quantity of a good or service
offered for sale can usually be unmasked in a legal proceeding without
64. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371-75 (1969) and FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978), with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 247-58 (1947).
65. Cf. B. OWEN, supra note 4, at 48-52.
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a great expenditure of time and money or a great risk of error. This
is not true where the representation, though made to sell a product,
concerns an issue of contested scientific truth; but even here there is an
argument for allowing more scope to regulation than in the usual case
of scientific controversy. To begin with, V is lower. The creator of
product-specific information ordinarily can recoup all or at least most
of his investment through selling the product, and, as discussed earlier,
in an information market that operates without substantial externalities,
regulation is not so apt to carry us far away from the optimal level of
production of information. Moreover, P is likely to be higher than in
the scientific marketplace itself. Nonscientists are ill-equipped to
evaluate scientific claims, thus making the case unlike the ordinary
situation surrounding scientific controversy, where the "consumers"
in the marketplace of ideas are other scientists. And competing pro-
ducers of goods and services (unlike competing scientists in the market
for scientific ideas) may have weak incentives to unmask the lie to
the consumers. The dishonest producer may be a product or service
monopolist, implying that the diversion of business from other pro-
ducers that is caused by his lie will be widely diffused. Or, what has
the same effect, his misrepresentation may be common to the entire
market (e.g., smoking is good for your health), and again no one
will have much incentive to correct it.
A more radical proposition is possible: that there sould be no con-
stitutional protection for commercial advertising. Such advertising ap-
parently generates no more external benefits than the advertised prod-
ucts themselves do. It seems paradoxical therefore to allow virtually
unlimited regulation of the product (its price, quality, quantity, the
conditions under which it is produced, etc.) but to impose a constitu-
tional obstacle (granted, a somewhat porous one) to the regulation
of the sales materials for it.
4. Labor
The Supreme Court allows the National Labor Relations Board
to regulate with a heavy hand the speeches made in representation
elections.6 The objections to such regulation are twofold. First, E
is high because the claims made in representation elections-e.g., unions
reduce employment, cause plant closings, increase plant safety, reduce
(or increase) productivity-are difficult to verify; are indeed intensely
political. Second, the audience is knowledgeable and interested, since
66. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-19 (1969).
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the election touches their pocketbook concerns directly and deals with
matters related to their personal experience; so P is low. L seems
modest; it is the loss of the gains from unionization to the workers
if the employer's speech persuades them to vote against the union,
or the loss of the employer (possibly also to some or even all the
workers) if the union's speech persuades tham to vote for the union.
On the other hand, there is no problem of external benefits, so
V is low also. The employer captures the full benefits from convincing
the workers not to vote the union in (a similar situation is the
case of brand-specific information in product markets). And the
union, at least if it is viewed as a perfect agent of the workers in
the bargaining unit (granted, a big "if"), will act as if it captures
the full benefit from convincing the workers to vote it in. Hence regula-
tion will be less harmful here than in a speech market in which social
benefits are large relative to private benefits.
P has been the focus of debate in the scholarly literature on
representation elections. If, as increasingly believed, threats and mis-
representations, whether by union or employer, have little effect on
the outcome of the representation election, then the gains from reg-
ulation are slight and the high E becomes a decisive, though not
necessarily a constitutional, argument against regulation.67
5. Defamation
The case for legal regulation of defamatory statements also rests
on a low E (provided the statement is one intended to be understood
as fact rather than opinion-and for this reason and also because
statements of opinion are apt to be discounted by their audience,
implying low L, such statements are not actionable) and a high P.
P is high because the cost is external-the person defamed is not,
or at least need not be, part of the intended audience for the speech
or writing in question-and because, by definition, a defamatory
statement is likely to harm the reputation of the person defamed.
Of course, destroying one person's reputation utterly would do much
less harm than seriously damaging the nation's security or prosperity;
but for reasons already explained it is rare that serious damage to the
nation can be reliably predicted from a speech or writing, and the
67. See Goldberg, Getman & Brett, The Relationship Between Free Choice and Labor Board
Doctrine: Differing Empirical Approaches, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 721 (1984); Getman, Labor Law
and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REv. 4, 8-10 (1984).
Consistently with the growing scholarly consensus, the Labor Board has stopped trying to pre-
vent most misrepresentations made in representation campaigns. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982).
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damage is usually in the remote future and may therefore be modest
in present-value terms.
In recent years the Supreme Court has limited the power of gov-
ernment to protect reputation, particularly where the plaintiff is a
public figure. The rationale is a dual one.68 Such persons are more
newsworthy than private persons, implying that V is high and that
they have better access to the market for ideas, which lowers P; and
they are thought to be thicker-skinned and thus to suffer less harm
from defamation. The second point, even if true, does not support a dif-
ferent standard of liability. To the extent it is true, it will be reflected
automatically in the damages awarded; the thick-skinned will get lower
damages than thin-skinned, "private" people. It should not be an inde-
pendent ground for limiting the law of defamation. Notice also how a
rule which tends to drive sensitive people out of the political market
will impair the market in ideas, by limiting an important class of
disseminators.
The Supreme Court has limited the law of defamation chiefly by
forbidding judgments without proof that the defendant knew that
the defamatory statement was false, or was reckless in failing
to inquire into its truth or falsity. This confines liability to cases
where avoiding defamation is very cheap, implying very low E. The
principal defendants in defamation suits are the media. The effect
of exonerating them from liability unless they are proved to have
known that the defamatory statement was false, or to have been
reckless in not investigating its truthfulness, is to allow them to
externalize some of their costs. The analogy to the tort immunity
of charitable enterprises is close and rests on similar consider-
ations. News about public figures is apt to be underproduced,
both because others can copy the news without liability and because the
private demand is weaker than the social demand. Externalizing some
of the costs of production corrects, in part anyway (or maybe it over-
corrects!), the underproduction due to external benefits. The alter-
native would be to grant more extensive property rights in news,69
in order to cut down on free riding in the news market.
But notice the curious distributive effects of externalizing the costs of
news gathering by curtailing the law of defamation. Costs are shifted
from the news media, their customers, and their suppliers to the
victims of defamation. More than a redistribution of wealth is in-
68. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
69. The path staked out in International News Serv. Co. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 236 (1918), but never followed.
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volved. The victims cannot spread the costs of being defamed, because
it is impossible to insure one's reputation; therefore, if potential
victims of defamation are risk averse, shifting the costs of news
gathering to them by curtailing their ability to recover damages for
defamation causes deadweight loss as well as a redistributon of
wealth. This makes the denial of liability a more costly method of
encouraging news gathering than the traditional (now largely aban-
doned) tort immunity of charitable enterprises was for encouraging
charity. The principal effect of that immunity was on victims of
malpractice and other personal injury torts-torts against which poten-
tial victims can insure themselves.
The most surprising feature of the Supreme Court's extension of
first amendment principles to defamation is that it allows them to
be invoked in cases where the plaintiff is a private individual. When
the plaintiff is a public official, a constitutional defense against the
suit is consistent with the traditional and well-grounded suspicion of
the impartiality of efforts by government to repress speech critical
of it. But if a defamation suit is brought by a private individual (who
may however be a public figure in the sense of being a participant
in public controversy or a celebrity), it is hard to see why courts might
be suspected of undue partiality to the plaintiff, and why, therefore,
they cannot be trusted to balance the relevant interests in an even-
handed manner.
6. Right of Privacy
Under common law, true but degrading information about a person,
though not actionable as defamation, may be actionable as an invasion
of privacy. 0 Whether such an action can be maintained consistently
with the first amendment was placed in doubt by Cox Broadcasting
Co. v. Cohn,"' which reversed a judgment for broadcasting the name
of a rape victim when the name was part of the record of a legal
proceeding. With the plaintiff in such cases invariably a private in-
dividual, there seems little danger of the courts' being biased against
the media's claim that the information is newsworthy (a proxy for
high V). In Cohn, the information was not newsworthy, so there was
no reason to encourage it by externalizing the costs which the broad-
cast imposed on the victim's family.
70. For a good recent discussion, stressing the paucity of cases in which a plaintiff has
recovered damages under this facet of the multifaceted right of privacy, see Anderson v. Fisher
Broadcasting Co., 300 Ore. 452, 456-59, 712 P.2d 803, 806-07 (1986).
71. 420 U.S. 469, 469-97 (1975).
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7. Obscenity
The Supreme Court has adopted an approach to obscenity that
may seem remote from the Dennis formula. To be counted as obscene,
thereby losing the protection of the first amendment, a writing or
movie must be extremely offensive by contemporary standards and
must lack serious (= postive?) value." For PL/(I + i)n in the
Dennis formula is thus substituted a simple harm component, call
it H, which varies only with community standards (in effect, and quite
properly, introducing a degree of local variation into the legal stan-
dard). This substitution seems in mute recognition of the fact that
little is definitely known about the actual consequences of obscenity,
either near term or far term. All that is definitely known is that in
some parts of the country there is intense dislike of it.
Under this approach, instead of comparing H with V + E the
courts are directed to allow suppression of the material challenged
as obscene if V = 0 and H is greater than 0, and to allow suppression
if V is greater than 0 whether or not H is also positive. This may not
be a bad decision rule if H is considered wholly unmeasurable, for then
it cannot be compared with V. The category of the "bawdy," viewed
as intermediate between the serious and the patently offensive treat-
ment of sexual subjects, is extremely broad and encompasses a good
deal of what is now recognized to be great art and literature. One has
only to recall the scandal caused by the word "shift" in Synge's
Playboy of the Western World73 to sympathize with the Supreme
Court's reluctance to make nice comparisons of offensiveness and
social value on the extensive margins of the obscene.
It may seem odd, especially in an economic analysis, to assign a
social value of zero to obscenity, however revolting it is, given that
the market demand for it is very great and the external costs, as I
have suggested, unknown and conceivably small, quite possibly smaller
than the private benefits to the consumers of obscene matter. Two
points nevertheless support this procedure. The first is precisely that
the benefits are private. Markets in which producers are able to cap-
ture as private profit the marginal social benefits that their products
create are robust, and therefore in need of no special protection-
extraordinary, constitutional protection-unless the Bill of Rights is
thought to guarantee free markets in general. Second, when the
domain of what is prohibited is narrowly limited-to hard-core por-
72. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973).
73. See H. KENNER, A COLDER EYE: THE MODERN IRISH WRITERS 35-38 (1983).
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nography, or to live public displays of nudity as in topless dancing-
close substitutes for the prohibited matter remain, so that the net
diminution in private (and social) benefits is small. V really isn't
zero in these cases, but it may be slight.
If V is zero or close to it, a slight H will justify regulation (provided
E is low); logically, therefore, even if V is greater than 0, regulation
may be justified if H is large. This point is illustrated by Hudnut
again, and by the example mentioned earlier where (1) offensive though
not legally obscene materials are thrust on an unwilling audience-
so that H is higher than in the case where the only offense is to
persons who are unhappy to know that other people are being exposed
to sexually explicit words or sights or who fear the long-run con-
sequences of such exposure, and (2) the question is not whether to
suppress the obscene materials but merely whether to move them to
a more discreet location. Here, V may be sufficiently slight to warrant
regulation even if the material has redeeming social value. For
remember that V measures not the value of the material in question
but the reduction in that value caused by the regulatory measure. In
the case just put, that reduction may be very slight, so slight as to be
close to zero-especially if it is already close to zero because the social
value of the material is slight anyway. Hence the case for banning
lewd material from television and radio, where it is apt to be en-
countered accidentally by unwilling viewers, seems compelling; the
material remains available in the bookstores.
On this ground, I question the result in Cohen v. California."' The
defendant had paraded in a corridor outside a courtroom wearing
a jacket that said on the back "F the Draft." This was held
to be expression protected by the first amendment. The Supreme
Court recognized that the defendant could have substituted some less
offensive word, but was concerned that the substitute would be less
forceful. That is no doubt true. Yet the cost in V was merely the
slightly higher cost of communication by a less vivid means and
seems small relative to the H to the many people who had to frequent
the corridor on the way to and from the courtroom, not to mention
the possibility of interfering with the administration of justice. At
least the balance does not seem so clear as to warrant the federal
courts in preventing a state from deciding to punish such conduct. 5
74. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
75. i distinguish the case where the message is offensive because of its content rather than
its form. The swastika and the red flag offend people because of what they are symbols of;
"F- the Draft" offends many people because of the offensiveness of the language irrespective
of the thought sought to be expressed.
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Another questionable case is Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,76
where the Supreme Court invalidated a local ordinance that forbade
exhibiting nude scenes on drive-in screens visible from public high-
ways even if the scenes were not legally obscene. They were distract-
ing to drivers and though PL may have been modest, V + E must
have been very close to zero.
Cox, Cohen, Erznoznik, and Doran illustrate the doctrinaire streak
in the current jurisprudence of the first amendment, or more mun-
danely the refusal to allow the maxim of de minimis non curat lex
to operate. It is hard to believe that if any or all of these cases
had been decided the other way, the marketplace of ideas would
have been noticeably impaired, or that judicial opinions could not
have been written distinguishing these cases from those where suppres-
sion would impair that marketplace. The only justification for these
decisions is a fear that there is such pent-up public pressure to limit
free speech that if the Supreme Court opened the door only a crack,
the door would quickly be blasted off its hinges. Yet a glance around
the world will show that most countries whose political and social
institutions are comparable to ours have a thriving marketplace of
ideas (England, France, Sweden, Italy, Japan, etc.), even though
they do not have judicially enforceable constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and press.
8. Vagueness and Overbreadth
One of the objections to the ordinance at issue in Erznoznik was
that it was overbroad. It forbade the exhibition of bare breasts and
buttocks without regard to the purpose or context of the exhibition
in the movie. The Court pointed out that the movie might be a
documentary about a primitive tribe that had different mores from
our own concerning public nudity. The author of the Court's opinion
obviously knows little about drive-in movie theaters, but a more im-
portant point is that it is absurd to charge the Jacksonville City
Council with culpable oversight for having failed to foresee and make
specific provision for the possibility that the city's drive-in theaters
would buy their movies from National Geographic. Nevertheless, it
is a familiar technique in free-speech cases to strike down a law as
being so broad or vague as to encompass constitutionally protected
conduct even though the conduct of the person challenging the law is
not constitutionally protected. 77 That is the basis on which a striker
76. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
77. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972). Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
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engaged in violent picketing can defend against being convicted of
violating a statute that makes all picketing criminal.
The Court has justified this doctrine with an argument that can
be given an economic form: free speech is so fragile (in economic
terms, the speaker's incentives are weak because most of the benefits
of the speech are external) that its exercise can be deterred by the
threat of prosecution even if the threat inherently lacks credibility
because the first amendment can be pleaded in defense. The peaceful
picketer need not fear the outcome of a prosecution, since his con-
duct is constitutionally privileged. But it is only realistic to recognize
that many people will hesitate to engage in conduct that a statute
forbids, even if they have good reason to believe that, as applied
to their conduct, the statute would be held unconstitutional. They
cannot be certain of this, so the expected cost to them of prosecution
is positive-even apart from the legal expense of defending against
the prosecution-though slight. If we assume that much conduct pro-
tected by the free-speech clause is fragile in the economic sense that
most of its benefits are external and that it has good (private but
not social) substitutes, then we have reason to fear that the over-
broad statute may deter, toothless though it really is. A small ex-
pected private cost may exceed a small expected private benefit-
which may, however, be a substantial expected social benefit.
The other side of this coin is that by forcing the draftsmen of
laws to foresee and make provision for a variety of acts and practices
that might come within the literal terms of the law, the doctrine of
overbreadth increases the cost of drafting statutes that impinge on
speech and the press. Professor Bickel argued that this was all to
the good; it would slow down the legislative process and give greater
opportunity for reflection." So the overbreadth doctrine has two ef-
fects: it reduces the deterrence of socially desirable speech, and by
making it harder for the state to punish any speech it encourages
more careful consideration of the proper scope of state action in this
area. The first of these effects, however, is unimportant where speech
is not fragile because it does not generate external benefits. The area
where this is most clearly true is commercial speech. The case for hav-
ing a doctrine of overbreadth thus is weaker in relation to commercial
speech, and the doctrine is not applied in commercial-speech cases.
88, 97-98 (1940) (not necessary to show abuse in particular instance to strike statute down
as overbroad).
78. See Bickel, The "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide Open" First Amendment: From
"Sullivan" to Pentagon Papers, 54 COMMENTARY Nov. 1972, at 60, 66-67.
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B. Some Special Topics
I want to end by discussing very briefly the implications of economic
analysis for five relatively novel areas of free-speech law: subsidies for
speech, the free-speech rights of public employees, access to govern-
ment secrets, the "public forum" concept, and the defense of fair
use in copyright law.
1. Subsidies for Speech
In Buckley v. Valeo, 79 the Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment allows Congress to provide financial assistance to political cam-
paigns, so long as it doesn't discriminate among the candidates or
parties (though, as a matter of fact, the provisions upheld did
so, as we are about to see). The argument for such assistance is a
powerful one, not only because political information is apt to be
underproduced in a purely private market, but also because interest-
group politics will result in a distortion of the market by overre-
presenting some points of view for reasons unrelated to their intrinsic
merits. The argument against such assistance is also powerful: the
assistance cannot in fact be neutral. The general problem of regulation
by subsidy is that unless some method of allocation is adopted, the
subsidy will be dissipated by new entry into the subsidized activity.
This is obvious in a case like pollution. If instead of imposing costs
on polluters we subsidized them to stop pollution, the result would
be to increase the amount of pollution by making it a more profitable
activity; so in the end the subsidy would not achieve its objective.
The situation may not be much better with political campaigning. If
anyone who runs for public office can get a subsidy, the number
of candidates and parties will mushroom. While there will be more
political information there is no reason to think it will be better in-
formation; there will be no market, or other, control of quality. In-
deed, there may be information overload, in which case interest-group
pressures may become more rather than less effective.
So some allocational method is necessary. The one chosen has
been to limit public assistance to parties and candidates who have
proved themselves in the market by winning a specified minimum per-
centage of votes in a previous election. This method, however, dis-
courages new entry into the political market by strengthening the
hand of major parties. The effects may be dramatic. A new entrant
must usually spend more (at least in the short run) to enter a market
79. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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than incumbent firms must spend to maintain their position, because
the entrant must give consumers a reason to switch from a known
to an unknown product. The same is true in the political market.
So the net effects of public assistance to political campaigns on the
amount of political information are very unclear, and could be zero
or even negative.
2. Public Employees
The Supreme Court has held that public employees cannot be fired
or otherwise punished for exercising free speech, or even for their
political affiliation, unless the punishment can be shown to be nec-
essary to the effective functioning of the public agency.80 The political-
affiliation aspect of this doctrine has made substantial inroads into
the patronage systems that are traditional, particularly in local gov-
ernment. Whether this doctrine makes good economic sense is hard
to say. Although there are several million public employees in this
country, very few of them either want to express themselves publicly
on political questions or could attract any significant audience if
they did. Hence curtailing their rights of free speech may not have
much impact on the marketplace for ideas, implying a low V (though
more impact when government was smaller than it is today-which
may help explain why the doctrine emerged when it did). On the
other hand, the fact that these people work in the government means
that they may have more information about governmental mistakes
and corruption than people on the outside, so even if only a few
of them want to criticize their employer publicly, V may be substantial
if they are prevented from doing so. PL, however, is also substantial.
The difficulty of disciplining public employees and of formulating
and executing coherent government policies is substantially increased
by giving such employees the right to disagree publicly with their
superiors. Impairing the patronage system also reduces the effec-
tiveness of competition between political parties.8'
The doctrine would be compelling if the true meaning of the first
amendment were self-expression, because some, though not many,
civil servants do feel stifled if they are unable to express their true
political preferences without losing their jobs. But self-expression has
no obvious connection with the first amendment. Some people get
pleasure from expressing political or other ideas; other people get
80. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 662-63
(1976).
81. See M. JOHNSTON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 61 (1982).
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pleasure from wearing Gucci loafers. These are both modes of self-
expression and the only economic reason for making the first but
not the second privileged is the consequences for other people.
3. Government Secrets8"
The Pentagon Papers case,8 which held that the government could
not get an injunction against a newspaper's publishing classified
internal government documents so long as they did not contain up-
to-date military secrets, is widely regarded as a landmark decision
for civil liberties. The underlying assumption is that the effective
exercise of the right of free speech requires access to information
that the government wants to keep confidential. Hence anything,
or almost anything, that makes it harder for the government to keep
secrets from the press promotes first amendment values. This con-
clusion can be questioned. The evaluation of policies does not always,
and perhaps does not typically, require access to the same information
that the policy-makers have. Most people are less interested in whether
government policies are made in what appears to be a rational and
well-informed manner than in whether the policies work, and the
latter question is answered by observing the effects of the policies.
In other words, secrecy may make it difficult for the public to evaluate
policies ex ante but should not affect their ability to evaluate them
ex post. That we lost the Vietnam War was a more dramatic indicator
of the failure of our policies than that the policy-makers were pro-
ceeding on unsound premises. Notice that this argument is stronger
the more one thinks that verification is a more persuasive test of
truth than debate is.
An analogy can be drawn to the economic analysis of the choice
between negligence and strict liability in the law of torts.4 A negligence
standard requires a determination of the care that went into the
decision (e.g., to drive faster or more slowly) which resulted in the
injury to the plaintiff. A strict liability standard requires a deter-
mination only of the causal relationship between the decision and
the injury. A negligence standard thus requires more information
than a strict liability standard. Strict liability is the implicit standard
82. For contrasting views see Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and
Statutory Dimensions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1985); Sunstein, Government Control
of Information (forthcoming in CAuiFoRN LAW REvmw). See also Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV.
309, 339-52.
83. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
84. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at § 6.5.
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that people use in judging political issues. If a policy fails, the
politician who advocated it is not excused because he exercised all
due care in deciding to support it. One reason is that good information
about public policy is hard to come by. Another, and more pertinent,
is that the incentives to acquire it are weak. As noted earlier, the
individual voter has so little impact on policy that it doesn't pay
him to spend a lot of time and effort in trying to master the in-
tricacies of policy. This means the voter will be much more interested
in policy outcomes, which can be judged with little information,
than in policy inputs.
Another, and perhaps more important, point (for, as the example
of the Vietnam War suggests, many lives and much treasure may
be lost by waiting to evaluate policies until they have been proved
disastrous by experience) is that secrecy in government is necessary
to make an important market in ideas work well-the internal gov-
ernmental market. People are less likely to be candid with one another
in settings that are not confidential. If all government deliberations
had to be conducted in public they would be stilted, uninformative,
and unproductive. This is also the objection to wiretapping. But the
people who are opposed to wiretapping on this ground often and
inconsistently favor policies that would amount to continuous public
surveillance of communications within government agencies. With
similar inconsistency the media argue simultaneously that they should
be allowed to conceal their news sources in order to encourage the
sources to be forthcoming and that the government should not be
allowed to protect its own internal deliberations.85
The underlying issue is a familiar one in the economic analysis
of property rights in information. Allowing the creator of an idea
(an author, scientist, or inventor) to charge for its use involves a
tradeoff between dissemination and creation. The charge will slow
the rate at which the idea is disseminated, but will encourage it to
be created in the first place; forbidding him to charge for it will
increase the rate of dissemination if the idea is created but will reduce
the incentive for creation.8 6 Similarly, if government isn't allowed
to keep secrets, information about its operations will disseminate
very rapidly but less will be created in the first place. There is a
second tradeoff: government mistakes, corruption, etc., will be ex-
posed faster (because the government employee has greater access to
information about such things than the outsider-the point I made
85. As pointed out by Coase, supra note 2, at 386-87.
86. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at § 3.2.
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earlier in discussing the free-speech rights of public employees, a very
similar issue), but there will be more mistakes because government
will operate less efficiently.
4. Public Forum
Until fairly recently it was assumed that the purpose of the first
amendment was the negative one of preventing undue interference
with private markets in ideas rather than the positive one of pro-
moting the effective functioning of such markets. The "public forum"
doctrine, however, requires the government in some cases to make
public facilities available for persons wanting to express themselves.87
Thus the management of a public building may not forbid the posting
of political handbills in its lobby unless it can give a good reason for
doing so. A pragmatic defense of the public forum cases is that,
as government expands, the private sector contracts, and therefore
private markets, including markets in ideas, will shrink unless gov-
ernment is forced to make some of its facilities available to those
markets. This seems doctrinaire, however, in view of the incredible
size, wealth, and diversity of the communications media in this coun-
try and (a related point) the very small contribution to the marketplace
of ideas that throwing open government facilities to political and
artistic expression can make.
In terms of our modified Dennis formula, V, the loss of information
from a refusal to provide public forums, is slight unless the gov-
ernment goes so far as to forbid use of its streets, sidewalks, and
parks. E is also small, since such a refusal, provided that it is
implemented across the board, without discrimination in favor of
particular points of view, is a form of time, place, and manner
regulation rather than a regulation of content. But L is also small;
it is the opportunity cost of the space devoted to expressive activities.
5. Fair Use
My last topic is the defense of fair use in copyright cases. Although
this is a principle of copyright law, it has been argued that it ought
also to be a principle of constitutional law: freedom of speech should
be deemed to include a broad right of publishing or republishing,
87. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975). See generally Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities,
65 VA. L. REv. 1287 (1979); Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis:
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984).
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without the author's consent, any material bearing on politics or
other matters of public interest, such as the excerpts from Gerald
Ford's presidential memoirs that The Nation published without au-
thorization.88 But this argument gives too short shrift to the ef-
fect of a broad defense of fair use on the incentive to create ideas
and other information in the first place. There is a difference between
protecting the originator of an idea and protecting a disseminator
who takes the idea without compensating the originator. The first
amendment interest would seem actually to lie with the copyright
owner rather than the copier-with shoring up the incomplete system
of property rights in information rather than tearing it down.8 9 It
is no answer that public figures would still write memoirs even if
a broad defense of fair use cut into their market and thus reduced
their earnings. 90 It is all a matter of degree. Not all public figures
publish their memoirs; money enters into their decision; and the less
money there is, the fewer such memoirs will be published.
V. CONCLUSION
To sum up very briefly, I have tried to examine the major features
of the constitutional law of freedom of speech and of the press from an
economic standpoint. Many features of that law seem consistent with
an economic approach; others seem not to be. Without a fuller exami-
nation of the background of the first amendment and the principles of
constitutional interpretation, it would be irresponsible to urge that
the law be changed in the direction that economic analysis indicates;
and, as I noted, the indicated changes may be few. But limited as
its implications for legal reform may be, the economic approach
sketched in this article provides a considerable challenge to con-
ventional thinking. Apart from my general attempt to unify the law
of the first amendment in a modified version of Learned Hand's
free-speech formula in the Dennis case, I would stress as novel aspects
of my analysis a new argument against censorship and a new ground
for a limited allowance of censorship; a new argument for treating
88. See Hamel, Harper & Row v. The Nation: A First Amendment Privilege for News
Reporting of Copyrightable Material?, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 253, 301-03 (1985). The
Supreme Court rejected this argument. See Harper & Row Publishers v. National Enters., 105
S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (1985).
89. As the Supreme Court recognized in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977), in holding that the first amendment did not entitle a television
station to broadcast the entirety of a "human cannonball" act, which would cut down the
paying audience for the act and hence the incentive to produce it.
90. See Hamel, supra note 88, at 299.
19861
HeinOnline  -- 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 53 1986
54 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:I
incidental restrictions on speech more leniently than direct restrictions
even when the amount of speech suppressed is the same; my analysis
of the external harms from speech; the use of the size of actual and
potential audience as a simple proxy for the value of speech; a new
basis for distinguishing between political speech on the one hand
and commercial and pornographic speech on the other (by reference
to the greater importance of external benefits in the former category
than in the latter categories); the bearing on free-speech questions
of positive social discount rates; and the distinction between protecting
the creation and the dissemination of ideas. I look forward to seeing
whether anyone will pick up the gauntlet thus thrown down.
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